Citations for Warning Shots

* Göbel 2021
  + Why does the Chinese government repress some protests and not others?
  + Data on protest events in china 2013-2016. 70k events.
  + Repression most likely when the repressed group is asking for very costly concessions (land protests in general more likely to be repressed than labor)
  + **High concession costs invite repression**
* Abouzzohour 2021
  + Liberalized autocracies continue to use repression.
  + **When the threat of losing power is low, they use repression sparingly if at all. (p. 264)**
  + The perceived threat of opposition to the ruler is elastic, depending on the surrounding situation (269-270)
  + The highest level of threat to a ruler is total loss of power through assassination, overthrow, or secession. (269)
  + The threat of an event/actor is impacted by the way the regime reacts to previous events. For example, in Libya the regimes brutal repression fueled the crowds of opposition. (270)
  + Autocrats often rely on repression because it is generally less costly, financially and politically, and less restrictive than making concessions. (270)
  + The most beneficial use of repression for the authoritarian state is in the face of actual or potential threats.
  + Use of repression caused by threat of losing power, with the intensity determined by the level of threat (275)
* Asal, Gustafson, and Krause 2019
  + Why would states negotiate with weaker (minority ethno-politico organizations)??
  + Negotiating could legitimize the group or delegitimize the state, hence states prefer repression or ignoring.
  + Territorial control is the biggest predictor of negotiation (MENA only) – territorial holdings cant be ignored.
* Bellamy (2012)
  + **Strong norm of civilian immunity in international law, yet mass killing of civilians recurs.**
  + As such, states need to justify violence against civilians in a way that might plausibly be accepted. This leads to “military necessity” or “selective extermination” justifications. There are “anti-civilian ideologies”. This changes it from purely an issue of norms into a realm of interpretation of events. This allows perpetrators to sometimes get away with violence.
* Bloom (2020)
  + How do the repressed respond to repression? Does it deescalate?
  + Answer: Depends on what practices are being repressed. Finds that insurgent practices that draw allied support evade the escalatory effects of repression.
  + uses black insurgent practice in the us comparing civil rights protests to urban uprisings.
* Bratton & Masunungure (2007)
  + Popular response to Zimbabwean repressive campaign attempting to suppress economic and political activity in urban areas.
  + Found that it was not successful and the crackdown discredited the police and state institutions. Also, the repression emboldened the victims, fortifying ranks of the opposition movement.
* Carey (2006)
  + Reciprocal relationship between protest and repression. And protest is stable over time.
  + Negative sanctions very unsuccessful at soliciting dissident cooperation in democracies.
* Carey (2010)
  + Focus on how different types of domestic dissent influence the risk of such severe state-sponsored violence.
  + Only guerilla warfare increases the probability of repression onset.
  + Democracies decrease the risk of state terror and dampen the effect of large-scale violent dissent on the risk of repression.
  + Also finds that the longer a country manages to avoid repression, the less likely it is to suffer from repression.
  + Uses PTS
* Chenoweth, Perkoski, and Sooyeon (2017)
  + overview of the repression and nonviolent resistance literatures and how they overlap
* Christensen (2018)
  + Location of a protest influences likelihood of repression.
  + Rural protests pose a smaller threat and thus less frequent intervention.
  + However, when govs repress rural protest, fewer bystanders and less concern regarding backlash to lethal repression.
* Combes, Fillieule, and Bart (2011)
  + Affect of repression on the targeted. possible for elites and middle class to leave repression, but underprivileged often have no choice beyond radicalization and exit.
* Conrad and DeMeritt (2013)
  + Propensity of the leader to use violence against the citizenry is a function of the extent to which the leader is dependent on the citizenry. This can be through the bank (financial resources) or the ballot (political support). These are jointly influential. Democracy reduces state terror, even in resource curse situations.
* Conrad and Ritter (2013)
  + The effect of treaties on decreasing the prevalence of state terror.
  + Treaties and the judiciary have no effect when the leader is insecure, as in that situation, they will use repression to retain power. However, when a leader is more secure, treaties do increase human rights.
* Cunningham and Lemke (2014)
  + Starts with the correlates of civil war and then moves on to general civil conflict and internal violence. Not all just from the state.
  + Looks at how the traditional correlates of civil war affect commuinal conflict, one-sided violence, riots, purges, and coups d’etats
  + ELF, pop, terrain, economic devel, and regime type similarly affect different measures of violence.
* Daly (2014)
  + Uses variation in the soviet bloc to look at what groups were most likely to be targeted by violence.
  + DOES NOT SUPPORT the idea that groups that are most threatening to the states territorial integrity are more likely to experience repression.
  + Analysis suggests theat minority group demographics and the states coercive capacity better account for this variation.
  + State choose between repression, exclusion, assimilation, or accommodation when dealing with a group.
  + Measures coercive capacity using the proportion of armed personnel to ethnic group members – I don’t really like this right off the bat.
  + Supports the idea, however, that capacity is the thing that enables the state to engage in repression.
* Danneman and Ritter (2014)
  + Contagiou rebellion and preemptive repression
  + States more likely to use preemptive repression if civil war or civil conflict in the surrounding states.
  + State repression can be shaped by other, neighboring states internal policies and unrest.
* **Davenport (1995)**
  + “State repression is a function of either a unidimensional conception of domestic threats (i.e., where there is one attribute of political conflict considered by the regime) or one that is multidimensional in character (i.e., where there are several attributes considered), conditioned by certain political-economic character- istics: democracy, economic development, coercive capacity, dependency and lagged repression.”
  + Three different aspects of political conflict (conflict frequency, strategic variety, and deviance from cultural norm) are statistically significant in their rela- tionship to repression, supporting the multidimensional conception of domestic threats. Additionally, the degree to which the government is democratic signifi- cantly alters the pattern of relationships between political conflict and repressive behavior.
* Davenport (2005)
  + Covert repression. Looks at US domestic intelligence activity directs against a Black Nationalist organization in Detroit, MI in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
  + Covert repressive actions respond to dissent, laggesd repression and the level of economic development in the neighborhood.
  + In addition to those typical findings, shows that covert repression is also impacted by where the dissidents lice and according to the racial characteristics of the neighborhood in which potential targets are located. Profiling is essential to the explanation.
* Davenport (2007) – State repression and the tyrannical peace.
  + Variation even among autocracies when it comes to the likelihood of using repression. Single party regimes are generally less repressive than other forms of autocracies. Military governments decrease civ lib restrictions and the end of the Cold War has varied effects.
  + Main point – all autocracies are not the same and some autocracies do decrease repression, so democratization is not the only solution to decreasing repression.
* Davenport 2004 – The promise of democratic pacification: and empirical assessment
  + Two main mechanisms through which democracies might reduce repression: 1 0 both killing and restriction are reduced (pacified), while in 2 – killing is diminished while political restrictions are continued (tamed)
  + Overall political context matters when looking at the relationship between regime type and use of repression.
* Davenport (1996) – Constitutional promises and repressive reality
  + Looks at specific provisions in constitutions about political snc civil rights, what emergency powers are mentioned, and what restrictions are placed on these two factors. 1948-1982 in 39 countries. 73 constitutions total.
  + Relationship between constitutions and the actual state practices of repression are complex. Political context is important. These documents are not written in a vacuum.
* Davenport and Armstrong (2004)
  + Relationship between decmocracy and repression 1976-1996
  + Below a certain level (0.8 on the polity measure), democracy has no impact on human rights violations, but above that level, democracy influences repression in a negative and roughly linear manner.
* Davenport and Inman (2012)
  + Little is known about what affect repression has on other pollical phenomena.
  + Conflict-repression-nexus is still being explored (written in 2012)
  + The field is fractured.
  + Repression is conceptualized generally here, including all sorts of things like violations of civil liberties, due process, and personal integrity and security. Often times however, we operationalize this solely as the physical integrity violations.
  + Domestic factors generally outweigh international factors (trade dependencies, globalization-treaties) when it comes to repression when it comes to the making the decision to repress.
  + GNP decreases use of repression. But this is unclear as to how exactly it impacts the process overall.
  + Political institutions decrease state repression. This has been repeatedly and robustly shown time and time again.
  + Viewing this work cumulatively, repression has been found to have every single
  + influence on behavioral challenges, including no influence. For example, results have shown that repression increases conflict,30 decreases conflict up to a certain level of repression and then increases it—a U-shape,31 decreases some forms of dissent while increasing others,32 and has no impact whatsoever.33 (pg 624)
  + Order of things matters, sometimes repression uis decreased, allowing for more protest. It isn’t that repression was ineffective at decreasing the rates of protest.
* Davenport (1999)
  + Regime type and change does affect human rights and the use of repression.
  + Regime change is important for understanding repression.
* Davies 2016
  + The use of concessions for all states is generally counterproductive when that state is involved in a strategic rivalry whereas they tend to reduce instability when both democracies and autocracies are in a more peaceful international environment.
  + The study found little evidence of diversion, butitdid find that theinternational environment affects both policy choices and affected the level of instability in the state.
* DeMeritt and Young 2013
  + Repression is less costly where states do not rely on their citizenry for generating revenue, so that these states are more likely toi use indiscriminate violations of personal integrity as a policy tool.
  + Reliance on oil increases violations of personal integrity rights.
* Duxbury 2021
  + Threat theory: states toughen criminal laws to repress the competitive power of large minority groups.
  + In a study of the Us found that
    - States adopted new sentencing policies as a nonlinear response to minority group size
    - Sentencing policies were adoptes in response to white public, but not black public support for puinitive crime policy
    - Minority group size and race specific homicide victimization both indirectly affect sentencing policy by increasing white public punitive policy support.
* Esberg 2021
  + Dictators choose whether to repress and how.
  + Autocrats select their repressive methods based on the anticipated likelihood of responsive dissent.
  + The more visible the opponent, the more likely their death or detention will provoke backlash. When more visible, dictators will target those groups with alternative forms of repression like exile.
  + Uses data on the fates of candidates in the last elections before Chile’s coup to study this.
* Fariss 2014
  + Uses a new measurement model to demonstrate that respect for human rights has actually increased over time and that the perceived stagnation is instead due to the standards of accountability and reporting of watch organizations.
  + Generates the Fariss human rights scores using the measurement model.
* Fariss, Kenwick, and Reuning 2020
  + Leaders have an incentive to conceal their actions and destroy evidence of human rights abuse. Uses a more sophisticated model to account for the uncertainty surrounding death counts in one sided killing.
* Fariss and Schnakenberg 2014
  + Most studies of human rights treat different types of violations as independent or arising from the same underlying process.
  + They instead conceptualize different human rights violations as separate but dependent processes.
  + Novel measurement strategy base on network analysis for exploring theses relationsp.
  + High level of complementarity between most practices, but substitution effects are substantial but rare.
  + THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN DIFFERENT TYPES OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS MATTER
* Fedorowycz 2021
  + Looks at state non-repression rather than repression. What drives states to allow minority groups to operate?
  + Looking at the aftermath of WW1 poland (1918-1939) where most ethnic organizations were permitted aand sometimes encouraged while simultaneously the ruling powers engaged in discriminatory policies against the same groups and faced hostility from them. Why not repress when the ruling powers had the ability to ban their organizations?
  + Sometimes the state benefits from a divide and rule idea, in which having a lot of separate little groups ensures that a united opposition cannot threaten the states.
  + General idea is that within a broader ethnic group, as long as the majority of organizations are not repressed, they will not be unified in opposing the government.
* Fein 1995
  + Murder in the middle
  + States with intermediate levels of democracy are more likely to be repressive
* Ferrara 2003
  + Dissident responses to repression is context dependent.
  + Looks at Burma/Myanmar as an example
  + In 1988, the military regime faced a massive uprising. Brutal coercion failed to quell the rebellion, but suvveeded in suppressing the democratic movement a few weeks later (after August 1988)
  + By suspending the supply of social order, the regime created a Hobbes dilemma – choosing between dictatorship and anarchy.
  + Following this crack down, nearly 10000 dissidents fled to the guerilla controlled border regions whereas prominent dissidents organized political parties to effectively challenge the regime in the multiparty elections. (pg 315)
* Franklin 2008
  + Effect of shaming onf use of repression
  + Looking at challenges in 7 latin American countries, 1981-1995, find that human rights criticism does decrease use of repression, though the effect is short lived.
  + This is more likely when the criticism is from NGOs, religious groups, and foreign governments rather than from intergovernmental organizations
* Frantz and Kendall-Taylor 2014
  + In autocracies, how reliant the dictator is on co-optation shapes how repression is used.
  + Coptation of political parties and legislature leads to less empowerment rights (e.g. censorship) and more physical integrity rights violations. This is because this cooptation pulls potential opposition out of the general public and into institutions, making them easier to identify and monitor. In this case, widespread repression that breeds discontent is not worth it.
  + At the same time, co-optation creates the risk that rivals will use their new platforms to build support and overthrow, thus making physical integrity rights violations more worthwhile.
* Gartner and Regan 1996
  + Analysis of repression needs to include the political contexts in which the state operates.
  + Nature of the threat posed by the opposition group influences the impact of domestic/international factors on the decision to repress.
* Gibler 2008
  + Relationship between US foreign aid and human rights in recipient states
  + Aid policies do affect human rights, but indirectly.
  + Focuses on the opportunity costs of repression.
  + Selection model
  + The cost to aid for violating human rights is only slightly smaller than the cost of deviating form US foreign policy interests.
  + Conditional policies best.
* Gobel 2021
  + Why do china’s authorities repress some protests and not others?
  + Repression closely correlated both with the cos of concessions and protest intensity.
  + Small scale and peaceful labor protests in an urban local are rarely repressed
  + Rural riots against land grabs evictions or pollution are nearly always repressed with state sanctioned violence or arrests even with low participation.
* Harrijvan and Weerdesteijn 2020
  + A dictator can use economic dynamics to increase his support among the elite through corrupt practices [3], he can determine the extent to which he is supported by the masses by offering public goods and services to them [22] and he can withhold benefits to repress threats stemming from these groups [17].
  + Looks at this by analyzing Paul Biyas 37 year reign in Cameroon.
* Henderson 1991
  + Early study on factors that correlate with the use of physical integrity rights violations
  + Finds democracy, inequality, and economic growth to be significant
* Hendrix and Salehyan 2017
  + African regimes are especially likely to view challenges expressing ethnic and/or religious claims as threatening.
  + Relaxes the state as a unitary actor assumption
  + Leaders with a history of factionalism in their security forces face a delegation problem: orders to repress may not be followed or could even cause intraregime violence and/or defections. For this reason, states with divided security forces are less likely to enact repression.
* Herreros 2006
  + When is state sanctioned violence effective at securing citizen’s submission to the state?
  + Random repression does not usually prevent a shift in popular support towards the opposition, but when the state engages in repression but at the same time mimics a non-arbitrary repressor, that can be effective.
* Hill and Jones 2014
  + Looks at predictive power of identified empirical causes of repression Using random forests.
  + Democracy (or lack there of) predicts certain types of repression more than others.
  + Domestic legal systems and some economic and demographic factors are the best predictive indicators.
  + when government/dissident military violence produces a large number of deaths, governments often target noncombatants with violence. But again, this result is tainted by measurement problems. (pg 677)
* Lichbach 1987
  + dissidents substitute violent protest for nonviolent pretest behavior when confronted with repression.
* Mackin 2016
  + Looks at use of repression and protest in Brazil
  + Finds that 1997-2005, governors in a precarious political position are less likely to promote repressive policing strategies. Share of seats in the lefislature is a significant positive predictor of both harsh and mild forms of repression. Percentage of votes attained in the first round of the previous election is an additional significant positive predictor of mild repression only.
* Mason and Krane 1989
  + Carefully targeted repression may reduce the lecel of active support for the opposition, at least short term.
  + As repression gets larger and more indiscriminate, it may increase opposition as nonelites can no longer insure themselves as immune.
  + States will use repression when the structural features of the state leave them without other options of addressing reform.
  + Uses case study of El Salvador.
* McLauchlin and Pearlman 2012
  + this article argues that repression amplifies trends in cooperation or conflict existent in a movement before the onset of repression.
  + Uses compariarive analysis of four repression shocks from two nationalist movements: the Kurds in Iraq and the Palestinian nationalist movement.
* Mitchell, Ring and Spellman 2013
  + Relationship between domestic legal traditions and human rights practices
  + Theory: common law states have better human rights than civil, Islamic, or mixed law systems due to the procedural features like adversarial trial, reliance on oral argument, and stare decisis which result in greater jural independence and protection of individual rights. This is supported even when controlling for standard explanations of states’ human rights practices.
* Moore 1998
  + Tests expected utility theories explaining human rights
  + Find support for the idea that dissidents substitute violent protest for nonviolent pretest behavior when confronted with repression. (lichbach 1987)
  + No support for the idea that repression spurs violence in democracies but that high levels of repression are effective in authoritarian regimes. (Gupta, Singh, and Sprague 1993)
  + No support for the idea that repression works in the short run but spurs protest in the long run (Rasler 1996)
* Nordas and Davenport 2013
  + Youth bulges make countries more susceptible to antistate political violence.
  + Therefore, makes sense that governments would preemptively repress when there are youth bulges.
  + This holds even when controlling for actual protest behavior.
* Pierskalla 2010
  + Protest and repression are strategic. Game theoretic model. They are interrelated.
  + Protest and repression should emerge only if the opposition has a low prior belief of facing a strong government. Murder is in the middle (per Fein 1995s work) because in semidemocracies and transitioning regimes, there is higher uncertainty about the rules of the game, behavioral norms, and the capabilities of actors.
* Poe and Tate 1994
  + Democracy and participation in war are significant explanators of repression in the 80s
  + Effects of econ development and population size are more modest
  + No evidence that population growth, British cultural influence, military control, or economic growth affect levels of repression.
  + Only physical integrity rights.
* Regan and Henderson 2002
  + Inverted U relationship between repression and democracy
  + Threat is more important than democracy in the likelihood of repression
  + Controlling for the level of threat, less developed states with intermediate levels of democracy have the highest levels of political repression
* Ritter 2014
  + Dissent and repression are causally interrelated
  + State and groups are in conflict over some policy or good
  + Authorities repress to remain in office
  + Formal mode to evaluate how factors adjust this. Then event data 1990-2004
  + Finds that increase in executive job security decreases the likelihood that repression will occur in the first place, but increases the severity of observes violations.
* Ritter and Conrad 2016
  + Relationship between international human rights treaties and dissent?
  + Treaties affect dissidents as well as states.
  + Citizens more likely to dissent in treaty states with secure leaders and weak domestic courts
* Rivera 2017
  + While authoritarian legislatures enhance leaders’ capacity to prevent conflict and reduce their need for repression, the presence of opposition parties helps opposition actors to overcome collective action barriers and mobilize against the incumbent regime, increasing the states’ need for repression.
  + Authoritarian elected legislature reduce repression and the presence of opposition parties increases it.
  + Autocracies with opposition parties and an elected leg experience lower repression than autocracies with opposition parties but no elected legislature.
* Shadmehr 2014
  + Nonmonotone, U shaped relationship between the level of repression and income inequality.
* Shadmehr and Boleslacsky 2022
  + Strategic interaction between states deciding whether to repress activists and general public which decides whether to protest following repression.
  + Social norms matter
  + International pressure indirectly increases repression by shifting the publics belief in favor of the state, therefore reducing the incentive to protest.
  + To effectively deter repression, international pressure must be sufficiently strong.
* Shen-Bayh 2018
  + Judicial methods of repression – when do rulers repress their rivals in court?
  + Rulers use the ourts when confronting challengers from the ruling elite.
  + The courts legitimize punishment, deter future rivals, and generate shared beliefs regarding incumbent strength and challenger weakness.
  + Using original data on political prisoners in postcolonial sub-Saharan Africa, the author finds that autocrats were significantly more likely to use a judicial strategy against insiders and an extrajudicial strategy against outsiders.
* Siegel 2011
  + Conflicting conclusions regarding the effect of repression on collective action
  + I demonstrate that the extent to which repression reduces participation, and the extent to which an angry backlash against repression increases participation, depends critically on the structure of the social network in place; this implies the need for greater empirical attention to network structure.
* Slantchev and Matush 2020
  + Why do authoritarian rulers sometimes allow political action even when it leads to social conflict?
  + Game theoretic model
  + Rulers with capacity to fully repress create despotic regimes while rulers with more moderate capacity might opt for open contestation.
  + Rulers take the authoritarian wager by abandoning preventive repression and allowing opposition that threatens the status quo. The resulting risk gives incentives to the supporters to defend the regime, increasing the rulers’ chances of political survival.
  + Even moderate changes in the structural capacity to repress might result in drastic policy reversals involving repression.
* Slough and Fariss 2021
  + Sometimes large scale human rights abuses in the justice syste result from poor governance rather than repressive intent.
* Iqbal and Zorn 2006
  + Assasinations of heads of state.
  + Repressive leaders at a greater risk for assassination, but this effect is moderated by executive power.
  + Weak, repressive leaders in nondemocratic systems face the highest risk of assassination.
* Sorens and Ruger 2012
  + FDI and repression? No – its investment stock rather than inflow that is the better operationalization
  + We find no evidence that foreign invest repression, contradicting conventional wisdom and suggesting that the political gains from frequently dwarf any economic costs for governments.
* Sutton, Butcher, and Svensson 2014
  + When does the use of violent coercion against unarmed protests backfire on the government?
  + We find that a pre-existing campaign infrastructure increases the likelihood of increased domestic mobilization and security defections after violent repression, but is unrelated to international backlash.
  + Within ongoing NAVCO campaigns we find that parallel media institutions increase the likelihood of increased domestic mobilization and international repercussions after repression. This study points to an important selection effect of the NAVCO campaign and the critical role of organizational infrastructure, especially communications infrastructure, in generating preference changes that create the conditions where killing unarmed civilians becomes costly for repressive governments.
* Svolik 2013
  + Why does the military intervene in politics sometimes and sometimes leaves things under civilian control?
  + In dictatorships, threats to the regime need to be dealt with for the leader to stay in power. When those threats are mass, organized, and potentially violent, the military is the only force capable of defeating them.
  + In this case, the military holds sway and can demand greater autonomy and say in policy, with threat to intervene if the civilian leadership strays too far.
* Tilly – From Mobilization to Revolution
  + ADD TO MENDELEY
  + repression and toleration as well as opportunity and threat are determinants of the costs and benefits of collective action. Repression can sometimes trigger mobilization, but it may make any kind of action impossible. It plays a key role in the dynamic and relational structuring of repertoires of collective ation.
* Verwinp 2003
  + **IPE** analysis of Habyarimana regime in RW
  + use of coffee price to buy political loyalty from the peasant population
  + In the end of the 80s, the price of coffee fell and the regime switched to severe repression to hold on to power.
* White and White 1995
  + Assume that all states are repressive – look at Northern Ireland
  + Difference between repression by the state authorities and repressive actions by state agents.
  + Ethnic minorities more likely to be repressed than majoritied.
  + State repression by authorities vs agents different.
* Wintrobe 1998
  + Dictators dilemma – can control most aspects of peoples lives but not know what they are thinking
  + Economist formal analysis
* Wood 2008
  + Relationship between economic sanctions and state sponsored repression
  + Sanctions threaten the stability of the incumbent, leading them to use repression to stabilize the regime, protect supporter, minimize threats, and suppress popular support.
* Wright 2014
  + Mids and repression
  + I argue that seeking to revise territory abroad will affect domestic repression, but conditionally on regime type and conflict severity.
  + territorial revision can lead to in-group/out-group dynamics at home, making it politically beneficial to increase repression domestically against groups seen as being opposed to the conflict.
  + Autocracies are more likely to use their military for domestic repression, and thus are more likely to simply maintain or reduce repression because the military is now being used abroad.
  + The results of ordered logit analyses of state repression show that democratic states become more likely to increase repression when they are territorial revisionists, as those conflict-years become more deadly, while autocratic states are less likely to increase repression during the same periods.
* Wright 2020
  + I argue and find that democracies are most likely to increase repression when they are territorial revisionists, specifically increasing the use of imprisonment and torture. Autocratic states are more likely to increase repression during foreign policy-oriented disputes, as opposed to those fought over territory, which are less likely to escalate to full-scale war, and more likely to be domestically motivated.
* Xu Xu 2021
  + Digital surveillance in dictatorships – informational theory of repression and co-optation
  + I argue that digital surveillance resolves dictators’ information problem of not knowing individual citizens’ true anti-regime sentiments. By identifying radical opponents, digital surveillance enables dictators to substitute targeted repression for nonexclusive co-optation to forestall coordinated uprisings.
  + forestall coordinated uprisings.My theory implies that as digital surveillance technologies advance, we should observe a rise in targeted repression and a decline in universal redistribution.
  + I find that surveillance increases local governments’ public security expenditure and arrests of political activists but decreases public goods provision.
* Young 2013
  + The author offers a theory that explains how dissidents and states interact to jointly produce civil war. In sum, states that repress their citizens are the most likely to kill citizens and to generate dissident violence.
* Zhan 2021
  + authoritarian regimes may prefer to use redistributive policies to defuse social unrest under certain circumstances.
  + local governments in resource-rich regions do not spend heavily on coercive state apparatus. Instead, they generously hand out social security benefits to appease aggrieved citizens.
  + when conflicts arise between specific social groups with conflicting interests, redistribution may be a more effective
  + China focused

A couple competing views of the use of repression that are not necessarily mutually exclusive (categories pulled from Gobel 2021)

* Repression as a last resort
* Repression as a strategic deterrent to raise the opportunity costs of engaging in social unrest
* Repression as a function of cost/benefit calculations by local officials.